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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
For Release at noon on July 1J , 1955

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN

One of history's recurrent tides for peace may again be flowing
in the world today.

In the United States, among our allies and possibly even

in the Communist bloc there is a deep realization that a nuclear world war
would mean only mutual destruction and there would be no victor . Advances
of fantastic proportions have been made in the nuclear and thermonuclear
sciences in the past ten years. If utilized to the detriment of man, they
could very easily erase these achievements and those of past centuries in a
matter of days.

We have harnessed a new energy, the atom, that can destroy

cities and complete armies, against which there is little defense.

Yet, if

used properly, this new energy can be utilized for the benefit of mankind in
industry, transportation and power.
Almost a year ago I began to take particular note of these new
problems and dangers confronting us with the advent of the atomic and
hydrogen bombs.
the Senate,

In April I compiled my views and thoughts in a speech to

My entire source of information at that time as it is today was

from newspapers, magazines, quarterlies and public documents .

The

results of my first efforts to analyze the situation evolved around a chronology
of events occurring since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Nagasaki
and Hiroshima in Japan at the end of World War II.

- 2 Today l wish to expand on the more recent development , the
program !or the future and some o! the serious problems !acing the policy
makers o! the world.

There nrc three general areas which I wish to discuss:

l.

Radio active fallout.

2.

The position of atomic and hydrogen weapons in our military

program and defense system.
3.

An ef!ective program to preserve peace and to combat the

threat of world-wide devastation in nuclear warfare .
Radioactive fallout is a shower of dust aLter a thermonuclear
explosion.

The mushrooming cloud in an atomic or hydrogen explosion is

made up of dust particles which arc spread by the winds alter an explosion.
They settle down over wide areas with the winds or they are carried down in
rain or snow .
It was this dust that fell on the Japanese fishing boat that was

contaminated by fallout 100 miles from the Bikini hydrogen explosion March 1,
1954.
According to reports the fallout peril depends upon how much
radioactive dust is created in the moments following the explosion.

In an air

burst, dangerous fallout dust is made np of fragments of the casing of the
bomb and its vaporized nJechanical components plus the end products of the
fission and fusion reactions.

A wide range of chemical elements is involved,

a field in which I am strictly an amateur.
Also, according to correspondence with scientists and newspaper
sources, some stray dust particles floating in the air may become irradiated

- 3 to a high degree .

But the total amount of air burst dust is relatively small .

The fallout hazard, as I understand it, is much greater with an explosion near
or at the surface.

Tons of earth and rock and other terrestrial objects

destroyed by the explosion are sucked up into the great mushroom.
radiation transforms these particles into hot radiation emitters.
force of the explosion blows the radioactive dust very high.

Intense

The great

The heavier

particles may fall soon, while the light particl es may stay in space for a
long period of time.

The radioactive "hot" particles which fall in a matter of

hours after the explosion are the deadly menace.
The perplexing problem iEJ what effect do thenc experimental explosions have on the human race, today and in the future.

It is

generally recognized that the immediate fallout of radioactivity after a test
explosion in the immediate area is dang,e rous and deadly.

Inadequate answers

remain to the problem of the long-range possibility of increasing the natural
background radiation of the world as a whole.

.Another question unanswered is

how much effect does the fallout have internally on human beings? Ther e have
been opinions of one extreme to the other coming from scientists and public
figures.

Only recently has there been any official pronouncements coming

from the Atomic Energy Commission.
Late in May, this year, a Yale physicist charged the AEC with
giving what he called misleading information about the danger to mankind
from atomic test blasts.

He warned that the radioactive fallout from such

blasts is producing genetic effects in mankind that will be showing up fo r

I

-

•8,

-

"thousands of years to come." The cxpress1on o:! the e fears h:ll dimmhhed
somewhat 1n recent weeks.
P r o fess o r Milton S. J ivingston of the

ias snchueetts In t1tutc of

Technology, also c hai r m an of the Federation of American Scientists,
that those people who

S<l)'

aye

H-bo m b tests are a danger to mankind nnd that

they must be stopped arc making thcae statements on an uninformed basi
and that time will have to pull the picture into per s pecth ~.
Eminent scientists such as Dr. Ralph Lapp and Dr. H. J. Muller
show concern about the long-lasting effect these experimental tests may have
upon the human race in the future.

However ,

they feel that we cannot jump

to conclusions and it is important to have more complete information from
authoritative sources.
Dr. Willard F. Libby, Commissioner of the AEC, speaking at the
Alumni Reunion at the University of Chicago, on June 3, 1955, said that:
"Tests, therefore, do not constitute any real hazard to the immediate health . 11
Incorporated in his speech was a state m ent on the genetic question prepared
by the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine to the AE'C.

The last

two paragraphs of this report read as follows:
"No measurable increase in defective individuals will be
observable at any time as the result of current weapons 1
tests, since the few radiation-induced defectives will not
change measurably the number of about 40, 000 defectives
who will occur spontaneously among the four million
births of each year in the U.S . It may be pointed out
that no significant change in the percentage of malformed
children has been observed among tho se conceived after
the war whose parents had been exposed to the atomic
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

- 5 "The foregoing conclusions apply only to the genetic effects
of weapons 1 tests carried out at the p1·esent level and of
foreseeable peacetime uses of atomic energy. The genetic
effects of a generalized nuclear war would be one of many
catastrophic consequences of such a disaster."
More intensive studies are needed and more information must be
made available before any sound conclusion can be reached on the question of
radioactive fallout.
In my April speech I expressed my concern about the theoretical
Cobalt bomb, its vast destructive power and its threat to all mankind.
C-bomb has never been tested.

The

My concern over this mythical bomb has

been minimized by the now numerous reports of the superbomb or U-bomb.
This new weapon was detonated in the March 1954 test on Bikini.

This was no

A-bomb such as was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945; nor was it
an H-bomb such as was tested at Eniwetok atoll in 1952. It was a U -bomb
triggered by fissionable uranium 235, fanned up by a fusionable hydrogen
ingredient and finally split asunder by enormous fissioning of ordinary
uranium 238.

This has been verified by the recent report made by Dr. Libby

of the AEC.
I believe that ordinary atomic bombs are measured by "kilotons"
and ther.TJonuclear weapons are measured by "megatons. 11 A kiloton is
equivalent to 1, 000 tons of TNT ; a megat on to 1, 000, 000 tons.

It has been

estimated that the Bikini explosion equalled 14 to 16 megatons.
According to Dr. Libby 1 s recent report, the energy is released by
fission rather than fusion.

This indicated that ordinary, cheap uranium 238

was the major explosive content and was responsible for fallout over a vast
area.

- 6 One of the most sigtu!ic:mt thm g

about this newly released

information on the H-bo mb i o that it means that Russin o r any other
nation capabl e o £ making atomic bombs can, with a little more cf!ort,
create super-bombo.
This cheaper weapon is tremendously more deadly thnn a pure
hydrogen bomb.
heat and blast.

The destructiveness of a hydrogen bomb is produced by
By adding ordinary uranium to this weapon, the additional

lethal radioactivity is created.

Dr. Lib by's report has confirmed, at long

last, the speculations and deductions of eminent scientists like Dr. J. Rotbhtt,
British physicist and Dr . Lapp, as well as many others.
There arc several conclusions that can be drawn !rom the
information made available t.o the general public.

The U-bomb is cheap.

The weapon can he made in any size because of its comparative simplicity
and the cheapness of Uranium 23().
bomb is the method of delivery.
for days, weeks or months.

The only restriction on the size of the

One of the results is that the fallout persists

In addition to its direct or external radiation

c!!ccts, the weapon creates toxic products like Strontium 90 and radioactive
iodine in large quantities, which arc internally damaging.
The information finally coming out is material which is vital in
our civil defense set-up.
was detonated ,

It has been almost

~months since the super-bomb

Out for the fallout that sickened the Japanese crew 100 miles

from the explosion site, the non-official scientific world might not have
learned that the United States had achieved a vastly more powerful weapon.

- 7 Until Libby's talk to the Chicngo alum ni, AEC's comments on
fallout had be e n pretty well limited to the much-publicized news release
by AEC Chair m an L e wis L. Strauss last February 15, 1955. In it, he
officially conceded the existence of fallout and described the pattern it took
at the Bikini te s t.

Adm iral Strauss did not discuss "persistence" --how long

and to what extent fallout radioactivity can deny humanity a normal aboveground existence.

This is the information which is necessary to have made

known in order to prepare any type of defense.
Dr . Libby has now testified that fallout radioactivity becomes
one-tenth as intense seven hours after the burst, one-hundredth after the
first two days, one-thousandth after the first two weeks, and one ten-thousandth
after the first three months.
The AEC has been very reluctant in releasing official facts
about atomic and hydrogen bomb tests, the after-effects, persistence of
fallout or any recommendations for protection against the heat, blast and
radioactive fallout, products of these thermonuclear blasts.

The first official

facts about the March 1, 1954 blast were released by the AEC on February 15
of this year, almost a year later.

In fact the AEC denied the existence of the

new super-bomb until the recent Libby report.

I fear that the Administration

has failed to take the public into its confidence.

We must face up to the facts

and adequate information must be available if we are to carry out any
realistic program of defense .
The people must have all the facts possible so that they can
understand the nature of the problems which confront them.

We in America

- 8 do not need a glossy coating on unpleasant mnterial.

I£ wo nro supp'i d with

the neccs snry information, there will be no panic or hysteria.

I think

perhaps some o! the lack of interest in our civil defense program is due
to the fact that people do not realize what we are faced with in thermonuclear
weapons.
I wish to voice my unqualified support for tho United States
proposal that the United Nations evaluate the effects of nucleat· radintion
and fallout from atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.
in my previous speech.

I spoke of such a plan

The proposal was originally suggested on March 6,

1955 by the Federation of American Scientists, a group of 2, ZOO United States
scientists and engineers concerned with science's role in world a!!airs.
This proposal is a major step forward.

An assemblage of

radiological information £rom all sources will make it much easier to answer
the questions raised throughout the world about the possible harmful effecte
of nuclear tests,
This U, S . proposal was announced by Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr . at the United Nations commemorative session at San Francisco.
This proposed study is essential to insure that humanity is not endangered by
these tests.

A general study of this nature has already been undertaken by

the Federation with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation .
At this point I think it appropriate that I speak briefly about
several problems involving our scientists -- namely, security and the
shortage of capable scientists and engineers.

- 9 -

In the May 27 issue of Science, a bulletin of the American
Association fo r the Advancement of Science, Dr. M. Stanley Livingston
said great difficulty had been met in finding scientists willing to talk in
public about the problem of nuclear radiation hazards.
11

This experience illustrates," Dr. Livingston reported, "one

of the political dilemmas in which we find ourselves, ••• Those who know
won't speak and those who don't know cannot speak with authority," Security
regulations, fear of controversial issues and administrative restriction on
speaking by employees were cited by Dt•. Livingston as the reasons that a
scientific-political program was difficult to arrange.
It is unfortunate that in this nation of ours that men who attempt

to voice an opinion run the risk of being accused of having communist leanings
or lacJ ;rofessional competence,

We are fortunate that there at·e a few who

are willing to take the risk and express their particular viewpoint.

Without

these few we would be lost because solutions can be arrived at only after
proper discussion.
Insecurity in the field of science has a definite bearing on the
appeal and inducements to bring new and fresh talent into the science and
engineering fields.
In an address before the Alumni Federation of Columbia University,
Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said that in the
decade from 1950 to 1960, the Soviet Union would graduate 1, 200, 000 scientists
and engineers, compared to 900, 000 in the United States.

He warned that

• 10 -

unless eomething wns done nt once, Soviet scientific manpower might well
outnumber ours in many key areas.
In an article in the May 31, 1955 issue of the Washington Evening
Star, Ben . H. Bagdikian brought forth some very enlightening !igures.

Thi&

article cites a 1953 poll of science Ph. D. 1 s graduating from rescnrch
universities which showed them equally divided where they would like to work,
one-third each in Government, industry and universities.

In 1954 --after

the investigation of Fort Monmouth and the case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
-- a poll of Ph. D . 1s showed that the 33 percent who wanted to work for the
Government had dropped to 8 percent.

The chief reason given : security .

The nation cannot a!fort to discourage young scientists.

At a

time when its requirements for trained men arc rising sharply, bachelor
degrees in science have been dropping, 20 percent in 1950-51, another 25
percent in the next year.

In four years all bachelor degrees in science and

engineering have dropped from 80, 000 to 34, 000,
the quality of Russian scientists and engineers .

We cannot underestimate
If this trend is not diverted

we will be threatened with the loss of the battle for scientific manpower.

In

addition the Federal government cannot affort to encourage public contempt
of highly trained and skilled men in the s cicnces\
I plan to discuss this matter of scientist and engineer shortages
more completely at a later date.

Briefly, there are a number of things

which can be done to give new life to the incentives in the science fields.
Encourage the study of science at the high school level; better teaching

- 11 -

methods and facilities; a correction of the selective service laws; a Federal
scholarship program to help worthy students meet expenses; and finally a
better public relations and security program.
Theoretically, the entire human race can for all practical purposes be eliminated for the small sum of about 40 cents per human, give or
take a few cents either way.

The authority for this statement is credited to

Dr. Leo Szilard, a distinguished physicist, by columnist Stewart Alsop.

This

statement is somewhat misleading Gince it makes no allowance for the cost
of delivery or the attrition of defense.

It assumes in effect, a deliberate,

unopposed effort to commit global suicide, for which I presume the human
race is not yet ready.
IIowcvet· accurate this statement by Dr. Szilard may be, it
makes it very plain that this enormous ,s cientific advance opens up the possibility of genuinely unlimited destruction at very low cost.

Combined with the

fallout phenomenon it basically transforms the whole world situation .
The second question which faces our policy makers who must
deal with these new advancements in science and warfare is -- what part do
the atomic, hydrogen, and super-weapons play in our overall military and
defense program?
At the height of the debate over our foreign policy in the Formosa
Straits, Secretary of State Dulles put forth a new policy, endorsed by
President Eisenhower -- the doctrine of 11 limited11 atomic war with tactical
weapons.

This approach seemed plausible at first glance, but further

examination brings a considerable number of doubts to mind.

- 12 In 1949 this doctrine may have been a great deterrent to war,
because of our great superiority in the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons .

\le no longer have this great advantage .

has advanced much faster than predicted .

The Soviet Union

We do not know whether they have

the U-bomb, but we do know that they have tested the H-bomb.

It is likely

that they will have the super -bomb in the ncar future if they do not bnvc it
already, because of the general simplicity in development of this new force,
once you have mastered the atomic bomb, which they ha\·e done .
Tactical weapons used on military targets only, is a wishful
attempt at minimizing the daneers of nuclear warfare .
on this increased precision and accuracy?

These nuclear weapons, large and

small, arc subject to error, human and mechanical.
change at the last moment .
cities.

Can we rely entirely

Weather conditions can

Military installations arc usually ncar towns and

A weapon large enough to insure the destruction of such a military

target will almost inevitably take a toll of non-military areas .

To paraly7.e

an enemy it would be necessary to hit lhc centers of industry, which are
heavily populated .
W\! may use a small atom bomb on an aggrcs sor, but we can
expect retaliation.

The enemy may not have perfected a tactical atomic or

hydrogen weapon , so they will drop several large ones.

The next step would

be a thermonuc l ear holocaust out of which would emerge no victor .
I find little assurance in the possibility of limiting an atomic war
once it was otartcd .

- 13 -

We have geared our national defense policy to nuclear weapons to
such an extent that we are not really prepared to fight a non-nuclear war .
We are cuttin3 the budgets of our armed services and reductions are planned
in manpower.

The c onsequences of a cut-rate defense policy can be disastrous .

I am pleased with and wholeheartedly endorse the increase in the Defense
Department's funds, being granted for fiscal year, 1956. At this point I wish
to take the opportunity to commend my colleagues here in the Senate who have
taken it upon themselves to warn the peo ple against the complacency about our
air superiority over the Soviet Union .

Extended dabate and testimony indicate

that we are not necessarily in the lead in every respect in air superiority. Our
advantage today is in means of delivery, but Stewart Alsop reported on May 16,
1955 that the Russian Type 39 and Type 37 do the same jobs as our B-47s and
B-52s with half the number of engines.

This means that the Soviet engineers

have developed jet engines with twice the thrust of any yet achieved in this
country.

All indications are that we are neck and neck in the race to develop

the intercontinental missile.

Perhaps our biggest asset is our industrial

capability and an advantage in offense and defense due to our air bases around
the world.
A revulsion to the use of nucle ar weapons is developing throughout
the world.

It is not very different to that which eventually was followed by the

banning of poison gas and bacteriological weapons after the first world war.
When that revulsion is added to the prospect of mutual annihilation, it may be
that atomic weapons may also be headed for outlawing.

If that should be the

- 14 -

en c, we arc playinc into tltc hands of the Russians by relying nlmo t
exclusively on nuclear weapons in our plans !or massive wnr!nre.
Rccenttr Brig .

G~.;neral

Thomas R . Phillips, m11itnry analy t

o! the St . Louis Post-Dispatch, called for the abolition of nuclcnr weapons
and proposed in effect that the tA 10 countries, which have 160, 000, 000
mo r e people than the Communist bloc, match the armed strength of the
Rusaian and satellite forces .
Phillips said that "a nuclear war is oo destructive that no one
could possibly win . "

He continued: "Such a war has no relation to any war

that ever has been !ought before .
destroys i t self.

It is necessary to prevent it before mankind

A single thermonuclear bomb today can release more explosive

energy than has been used in all wars since gunpowder -.vas invented."
The greatest problem that we face in the future is setting up a
world-wide program for the advancement o! peace and an operative disarma ment program .

It seems much ~ore difficult, however , to chart a positive

and constructive future than the negative one that we have been following, up
to this time.
As Albert Einstein once said, "Every step appears as the unavoidable consequence of the preceding one.

In the end there beckons more and

more clearly general annihilation . "
Man has developed the means to destroy himscH .
nuclea r disarmament agreement may tal<e years to reach.

A satisfactory

Our first objective

should be to get on at once with the discussions which may lead to an

~grccmcnt.

- 15 In considering the possibilities of an arms control program
there are several things which must be considered.

Huge bomb stockpiles

in themselves are no longer of any great advantage because of the unlimited
destructive power of these super-bombs ,

As Dr. Libby said in his repor t ,

3 0 ten -megaton U - bombs co uld blanket the entire continental United States
with radioactive fallout and, of course, cause enormous blast, burn, and
localized radiation in the immediate areas hit .
The value of numerical superiority in nuclear weapons has
declined considerably.

The American lead in the stockpile of atomic and

hydrogen weapons is of l ess significance today ,

If the enemy has enough

bombs to d e stroy us , there is little advantage in our having enough to destroy
him three or four times over .

Scientists moreover now believe we are

appr oaching the ultimate weapon in the IBM -- the intercontinental ballistic
missile -- which will soar through the stratosphere to bring death and
destr uction from b l ast, radiation, fir e , and fallout.

The ec.rth is of a

limited size and the IBM is believed to be virtually unlimited in distance and
destr uctive powers.
International inspection, as first proposed in the AchesonLililcnthal-Baruch plan, no longer provides fool-pro0£ knowledge of a nation ' s
nucl ear buildup .

With natur al ur anium as the basic i ngredient, onl y a minimum

amount of the costly uranium 235 and plutonium need be produced and could be
easily hidden.

There will be no need for many huge power sources, no need

for enormous gaseous diffusion plants , such as that at Oak Ridge, Tennessee .

- 16 -

t·

Ae so pointedly stated by Wnshmr,ton Post

columni t, Chalmers Roberts, leaders on bo th sides of the iron curtn1n nrc
beginning to alter their thinking and policies because of the nuclear !act., of
life.
It has become quite obvious that absolute control of all fissionable

material -including each and every weapon -is now impossible.

It

10

im-

poosiblc because it has become relatively easy for any nation which has
mastered the original technique to manufacture !'iosionable material and to
create A and H bombs.
There have been a number of proposed dioarmamcnt
programs,

It is generally agreed that in this day and age, a relative, rather

than an absolute program of controls over all types o! arms <lnd <lrmcd forces
might be obtainable.

A pre-r('quisite to any effective arms control would have

to be a relaxation o! world tension .

There is some indication that there may be

a general relaxation of tensions at the present time.

That possibility will be

put Loa test at the forthcoming summit meeting of the Big Four.
Any effective arms control plan may also require a ban on nuclear
teots.

There arc arguments, pro and con in this respect.

Continued tests of

nuclear weapons arc probably of less value to the United States than they were
several years ago, prior to the testing of the H-bomb.

Now our scientists and

defense officials arc primarily interested in greater weapon efficiency.

Con-

tinucd tests would be more useful to nations who have not progressed as far
in nuclear weapons as America.

Tests would be necessary for all countries

- 17 which are attempting to develop the intercontinental ballistic missile.

As

I have said, the IBM is believed to be the ultimate in weapons and it is the
goal which the United States must reach first, unless an effective arms control
can be perfected.
A ban on tests would introd:.1ce an element of uncertainty into the
development of guided missiles.

The scientists could not be sure that the

missile would perform as calculated.

Concealm~nt

of tests might be

possible in deep mines, though it would limit their usefulness.

I seriously

doubt that anyone could conceal an H-bornb explosion.
One of the greatest problems in any arms control program would
be the question of how to make use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
and at the same time eliminate bomb - making potentialities.
In addition it is necessary that reductions in conventional weapons
proceed along with nuclear disarmament.

If arms control were limited to

nuclear weapons, the Soviet would hold a decisive advantage wi.th its massive
ground forces and new advancement in air power.
Our country has been the target of much harmful propaganda
abroad, due to the shift in winds at the March 1, 1954 H-bomb test at Bikini
and the accidental injury to Japanese fishermen and some of the Marshall
Islanders.

It is clear that we will suffer further harmful propaganda if we

continue tests without having the approval of friendly and neutral nations.
As long as we must compete with the Soviet Union in the race for superiority
in thermonuclear weapons we must continue to test these weapons .

- 18 Therefore, I wish to emphasize Again tbo.t a Umtcd N tion
which would confirm the AEC assurances that '" ell-scf guarded to t

tudy
in

small numbers would not exceed the danger threshold, would do much to
quiet fears among our allies and friends.
Ambassador Lodge could not have chosen a better

~ay

to relieve

fears about radioactive fallout than to propose a survey through the United
Ni\tions .

I sincerely hope that the Administration will press !or support of

the Ambassador's proposal before the United Nations in September .
In the meantime it would be most appropriate for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to begin consideration of Senate Concurrent
Resolution 22, a resolution favoring United States participation in a scientific
commission within the United Nations to study certain ef!ects of nuclear
explosions .

This rct>olution was introduced by the distinguished Senator

from Maine, Mr. Payne.

I am proud to be one of the co-sponsors.

Before

adjournment, I feel that it would be a big help if the Senate went on record
overwhelmingly in favor of Senator Payne's resolution .
In conclusion , let me say that it would be foolish of us in America
to relax any sound nuclear and military preparations until we can actually
bring the Communist bloc nations to terms by getting them to agree to accept
conditions under which there can be r eally effective international co:1trol of
armaments of all kinds .
A fitting statement to end my remarks is credited to Albert
Einstein.

When asked what he felt the weapons of\ ·orld War HI would be,

. ..
- 19 he replied something to the effect that he did not know what weapons would
be used in the next world war, but he was sure that the weapons used in
World Var IV wo uld be rocks.
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